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Secondary Data: A Primary Concern
ABSTRACT
This Note addresses privacy concerns implicated by rising
secondary data mining. Secondary data mining is the use of personal
information for a purpose other than the original. This complex
technology drives billions of dollars in commercial industry yet
remains largely unregulated. This Note examines the current state of
the data mining industry and the behavioral fallacies that belie
societal concerns about online privacy. Further, relevant federal, state,
and constitutional laws appear outstripped by these technological
advances. An analysis of potential privacy solutions examines the
advantages and disadvantages of implementing each one through the
privacy community, the federal government, and the private sector.
Finally, this Note concludes that implementing a solution through any
one entity would not sufficiently protect against privacy harms. As
such, this Note proposes a coregulatory solution to treat secondary
data's privacy concerns as a market failure. This solution offers a
practical way to safeguard personal data while aligning incentives
between third parties and users.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. B ACKGROU ND ...................................................................... 196
A . D ata M ining ................................................................ 196
B. Current Privacy Laws .................................................. 198
1. Federal Law s ....................................................... 198
a. Current Privacy Statutes .......................... 198
b. Limited Privacy Protections of HIPAA
and Other Industry-Specific Federal
L a w s ......................................................... 199
c. The Federal Trade Commission's
Involvement in Consumer Privacy ............ 201
2. State L aw s ........................................................... 203
3. Constitutional Law .............................................. 203
C. "I'll Hold the Popcorn" Secondary Use Problems
with the Third-Party Doctrine .................................... 205
194 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 18:1:193
1. The Third-Party Doctrine .................................... 205
2. Beyond the Third-Party Doctrine: Other
Privacy Argum ents .............................................. 207
3. Secondary Data Use: What's the Harm, Really?. 208
II. A N A LY SIS ............................................................................. 209
A . Social M ovem ent .......................................................... 210
B . F ederal L aw ................................................................. 211
1. B ackground .......................................................... 211
2. Model Federal Law Proposal ............................... 212
3. HIPAA as Alternative Model Law ....................... 213
C . In d ustry ....................................................................... 2 16
III. SO LU TIO N ............................................................................ 2 19
A . F ram ew ork ................................................................... 220
IV . CON CLU SION ....................................................................... 222
"YOU are the product." So said Don Draper, famous fictional
ad man from the television series Mad Men.' Decades later his words
remain prescient. Americans are bombarded by advertising.2  And
that does not begin to describe the layer of advertising just beneath
the surface of people's lives. This "subsurface" advertising is called
the secondary data industry.3 Secondary data is personal information
used for purposes other than those originally given.4 Often companies
do not tell people they are using their information in alternate ways.5
They collect, analyze, and experiment with secondary data to better
target potential purchasers.6  And this is only the beginning:
secondary data threatens to know people better than they know
themselves. The Target Company found this out firsthand by using
1. See Mad Men: For Those Who Think Young (AMC television broadcast Jul. 27,
2008).
2. See Louise Story, Anywhere the Eye Can See, It's Likely to See An Ad, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/business/media/15everywhere.html
[http://perma.cc/QA9F-8U2L] (citing research that says Americans typically saw up to five
thousand messages a day, up from two thousand a day thirty years ago).
3. See, e.g., Tal Z. Zarsky, 'Mine Your Own Business!: Making the Case For the
Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Policy, 5 YALE J.
L. & TECH. 1, 16-18 (2003) (describing how companies use secondary data to tailor advertising to
potential consumers).
4. See id. at 33; see also "secondary data," CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/secondary-data?a=business-english
[http://perma.cc/CKR8-VNED].
5. See Zarsky, supra note 3, at 32.
6. See id. at 2-4.
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secondary data to target shoppers' habits.7 One consumer, upset that
Target sent his high school daughter baby coupons using its secondary
data tools, complained that such faulty analytics encouraged rather
than predicted behavior.8 When the manager called to apologize, the
man backtracked, admitting he had not been aware his daughter was
pregnant.9
Though Target's marketing methods may seem extreme, such
secondary data use is becoming the norm. However, secondary data's
rapid growth and eerie accuracy belie the host of privacy concerns that
plague the unchecked use of other people's personal information.10
For instance, the online dating site OkCupid responded to criticisms of
allegedly manipulative behavioral testing by labeling privacy concerns
pass6.11  OkCupid cofounder Christian Rudder famously stated,
"OkCupid doesn't really know what it's doing.... But guess what,
everybody: if you use the Internet, you're the subject of hundreds of
experiments at any given time, on every site. That's how websites
work."
12
Dismissing privacy concerns does not make them disappear.
Instead, these experiments expose third parties' current leeway to use
personal online data as behavioral lab fodder.13
This Note addresses the current state of secondary data mining
and offers a framework to reconcile the concerns of various
stakeholders within a coregulatory model. Part I provides background
on data mining and accompanying privacy concerns. It discusses the
current state of relevant privacy laws in the federal, state, and
constitutional spheres. Part II analyzes potential solutions to
secondary data's privacy issues based on where the onus, or duty, to
implement the solution lies. Part III proposes a coregulatory solution
to secondary data use that seeks to harness the combined power of the





10. Brian Fung, OkCupid Reveals It's Been Lying to Some of Its Users, THE SWITCH





13. See Andrew Chin & Anne Klinefelter, Content: Social Networks and the Law:
Differential Privacy as a Response to the Reidentification Threat: The Facebook Advertiser Case
Study, 90 N.C.L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2012) (describing "databases of ruin" as a database's
aggregation of private facts that could cause someone legally cognizable harm if released).
20151
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.




Data mining is the process of identifying behavioral patterns
within data using algorithms.1 4 It is broadly called a "sense-making
application" because it culls volumes of raw information to extract
useful knowledge.15 Data mining not only uncovers existing behavior
patterns, but forecasts future ones.16  Indeed, it originated as a
prognostic tool.17  In the 1990s, GM researchers developed data
mining to search databases for product defects that were not
immediately obvious.'8
The prerequisite to data mining is, of course, having data to
mine. Lax legal parameters on data collection practices, discussed
later in this Note, have propelled the secondary data industry's
spread.19 Currently, US businesses can track, aggregate, and sell
private users' details to third parties as marketing profiles.20 Popular
companies like Facebook and Amazon maintain a robust trade selling
user internet profiles to third parties.2' Their privacy policies appear
to mollify concerns by acknowledging data-collecting practices and
requiring consent to use their sites.22 However, these exchanges belie
the extent to which third parties exploit user data for purposes
unrelated to the original transaction.23
Data mining involves multiple steps. First, the company
collects data from several sources.24 Then the company decides what
14. See Zarsky, supra note 3, at 4; see also Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The
Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging of Personally Identifiable Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 553, 555 (2008).
15. K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make
Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2, para. 23 (2004).
16. Zarsky, supra note 3, at 4.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id.
19. See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Infinite
Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 437 (2014).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 436 n. 8, 437, 448 (explaining that such companies indefinitely retain user
data like buying habits, files, and posts to sell to third parties for marketing analysis).
22. See id. at 452-53.
23. See id. at 474.
24. See Zarsky supra note 3, at 8-9 (noting an insurance company used such
data-mining sources as clients' payment information, other departments' policyholder histories,
and clients' personal information from data brokers selling it in bulk).
196 [Vol. 18:1:193
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data to mine.25 The company culls potentially relevant information, a
process called "data warehousing."26  Data warehousing aggregates
disparate bits of customer information with personal data purchased
from third parties.27  Then the data warehouse is stripped of
unreliable or redundant data.28 The remaining information is used for
data mining.29 Algorithms organize the remaining data and probe it
to discover descriptive or predictive patterns.30 Descriptive patterns
reveal links between variables that allow researchers to pinpoint
distinct categories of the dataset.31 Researchers use these links to
determine whether rules govern the associations.32  Predictive
patterns, meanwhile, allow researchers to derive future behaviors.
33
They can test data for potential behavior based on available data
clusters or track long-term patterns.
34
Data mining's complex and potentially invasive nature has
earned it comparisons to the oppressive and nightmarish qualities of
writer Frank Kafka's fictional world.35  Data miners accumulate
mounds of personal data so detailed and accurate that many people
believe data miners "probably know more about you than your
friends.'36 At the same time, data mining is reductive: it lumps users
into rough profiles to sell to third parties.37 Such processes enable
companies to potentially discriminate against customers based on the
data miners' stereotypes.38 Finally, data mining may violate basic
contract principles underlying users' interactions with websites.
39
Websites argue that users agree to be subjected to data mining
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Taipale, supra note 15, at para. 40.
29. See Zarsky supra note 3, at 8.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 11.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 11.
34. Id.
35. Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV.
1, 62 (2005); "Kafkaesque," OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american-english/Kafkaesque [http://perma.cc/
JYR2-ACRP].
36. Michael J. Milazzo, Note, Facebook, Privacy, and Reasonable Notice: The Public
Policy Problems with Facebook's Current Sign-Up Process and How to Remedy the Legal Issues,
23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 661, 681 (2014).
37. See Zarsky, supra note 3, at 22.
38. Id. at 25.
39. See Milazzo, supra note 36, at 668-69.
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practices by consenting to use their sites.40 But user consent to data
mining practices remains largely illusory.41 Most privacy policies do
not clarify the essential terms of the deal.42 Users often do not know
how, when, or in what ways the website may use their personal data.43
Nor are most users aware of the deal's financial imbalance. Users
essentially pay for "free" social media websites with their personal
information-to the tune of billions of dollars.44 Such lack of effective
notice arguably voids the idea that data mining is "consensual.' '45
B. Current Privacy Laws
A quick survey of current privacy laws in the United States
reveals a clutter of largely outdated legislation. Federal laws are
either stuck in the decades-old context in which they originated or
only cover niche industrial sectors. Though some states have passed
progressive privacy legislation, the myriad of evolving laws poses
significant compliance problems. However, this legal landscape may
offer valuable insights for building a more viable privacy legislation
framework.
1. Federal Laws
a. Current Privacy Statutes
Current federal statutes provide scant privacy protection in
this situation.46 The 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(EPCA) comprises Congress's attempt to offer broad protections for
electronic communications.47  Not much has changed since.48  The
40. See id.; Brian Womack, Facebook Experiment Draws Complaint from Privacy Group,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK.COM, (July 4, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
07-03/facebook-experiment-draws-complaint-from-privacy-group [http://perma.ccY723-S8KP].
41. See Milazzo, supra note 36, at 685.
42. See Michelle N. Meyer, Everything You Need to Know About Facebook's
Controversial Experiment, WIRED.COM, (June 30, 2014),
http://www.wired.com/2014/06/everything-you-need-to-know-about.facebooks-manipulative-
experiment/ [http:lperma.cc/5NRE-XKG7]; see also Milazzo, supra note 36, at 685.
43. Milazzo, supra note 36, at 682.
44. See id. at 678.
45. Cf. id. at 675, 678 (arguing Facebook's "free" sign-up process encroaches on privacy
because users do not expressly agree to terms underlying the exchange, namely Facebook's
collection of user data).
46. Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social
Networking Privacy Rights Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291,
297 (2011).
47. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (EPCA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711, 3117, 3121-3127 (2013)).
198 [Vol. 18:1:193
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EPCA contains several parts potentially applicable to consumer
privacy issues.49 However, closer inspection reveals that none provide
meaningful safeguards for information in today's surveillance state.50
For instance, the Federal Wiretap Act prohibits the federal
government from intercepting electronic communications without a
warrant.51  The Act is relevant to privacy concerns because law
enforcement uses data requests to force companies like Facebook to
release user information.5 2 Therefore, this Act seems to potentially
shield people from so-called "fishing expeditions" into their private
lives. However, it only prevents contemporaneous interceptions,
which is little use for the vast majority of social media users' stored
data.53  Its reach is further limited by its application to solely
governmental entities. In the same vein, the Stored Communications
Act (SCA) is less expansive than its name suggests.54 For example,
communications stored for more than 180 days require only a court
subpoena to be obtained.55 But even those stored communications
may not receive protection, because the SCA confines coverage to
computer-network concepts based in the year 1986.56
b. Limited Privacy Protections of HIPAA and Other Industry-Specific
Federal Laws
Other federal statutes may offer consumer privacy protections,
albeit for ancillary reasons and to a more limited extent. For instance,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
protects patient information in the healthcare context.57 The law
48. See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1213 (2004).
49. Lindsay S. Feuer, Who's Poking Around Your Facebook Profile? The Need to Reform
the Stored Communications Act to Reflect a Lack of Privacy On Social Networking Sites, 40
HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 475 (2011).
50. Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third-Party Doctrine
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 32-35 (2013).
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
52. See Josh Constine, Spying and Police Requests for Facebook Data Up 24% Since
2014, TECHCRUNCH, http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/04/facebook-government-requests/ [http://
perma.cc/B6GQ-P733].
53. Bedi, supra note 50, at 32.
54. See id. at 33.
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711.
56. Kerr, supra note 48, at 1212-13; see Feuer, supra note 49, at 496 ("[Tlhe SCA 'does
not easily apply' to social networking websites, as these websites do not fit within any of the
categories enumerated in the statute.").
57. Womack, supra note 40; see Martha Tucker Ayres, Comment, Confidentiality and
Disclosure of Health Information in Arkansas, 64 ARK. L. REV. 969, 977 (2011).
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narrowly tailors how covered entities may use such information.58 The
law then limits "covered entities" to health plans, healthcare
clearinghouses, or certain healthcare providers.5 9 Further, the law
provides consumers a right to receive notice about healthcare
providers' disclosures to third parties, including breaches.60 While
HIPAA's contours appear to offer stout informational privacy, it has
limited reach.61 As previously stated, only covered entities must abide
by HIPAA. 62 Therefore, data brokers are free to exploit medical
information revealed outside HIPAA's bounds.63 Data brokers sell
lists of people's names, along with their accompanying medical
conditions, to third parties, such as drug companies.64 The companies
shell out fees for access to these lists to learn which households suffer
from such conditions as depression, erectile dysfunction, and
Parkinson's disease.65  Thus, if a data broker sells Jane Doe's
information to her insurance provider, there is a possibility the
provider could misconstrue Jane's healthcare data by incorrectly
assuming certain things about her health based on her medications.
But if the provider nonetheless relies on those incorrect assumptions
to deny her coverage, there is nothing she can do about it.66
Other federal agencies have offered data privacy plans, from
the White House's "Consumer Bill of Rights" to the US Department of
Commerce's "Safe Harbor Framework" for personal data.67 As with
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)'s standards, discussed below,
compliance remains voluntary.68 Similarly, though the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA) regulates fitness devices that may accumulate
medical data, its focus is on safety, not on privacy.69
58. See id. at 976-77.
59. See Covered Entities, HIPAA PRIVACY RULES,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacylhipaa/understanding/coveredentities/ [http://perma.cc/N3FJ-
57P7].
60. See Ayres, supra note 57, at 985.
61. See id. at 972-73.
62. See id.
63. Womack, supra note 40, at 39.
64. See Ayres, supra note 57, at 972-73.
65. Id.
66. See id. (citing a case where an insurance company used inaccurate data purchased
from a data broker to deny an otherwise healthy claimant life insurance).
67. Consumer Bill of Rights, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, (Feb. 23, 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/flles/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-
draft.pdf [http://perma.cc/6G54-9BQ9]; Safe Harbor Frameworks, EXPORT.Gov,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ [http://perma.cclBT9K-CZHK].
68. See id.
69. See NY Times Editorial Board, Smartwatches and Weak Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES,




c. The Federal Trade Commission's Involvement in Consumer Privacy
The FTC's Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices Act arguably
offers the strongest consumer privacy protections at the federal level.
70
The Act confers broad power on the FTC to act against companies who
engage in "deceptive and unfair trading practices.' 71 A practice may
be "unfair" or "deceptive" when it likely causes substantial injury to
consumers, consumers cannot reasonably avoid it, and its costs
outweigh competitive or consumer benefits.72 The FTC may challenge
a commercial practice through administrative adjudication.73 The
FTC can issue regulations, specific orders, or civil penalties to enforce
decisions against liable companies. Indeed, the FTC has accused
various Internet services, including Facebook, of unfair trade
violations with respect to consumer privacy.1
4
However, critics argue that the FTC's enforcement fails to
address consumers' most salient privacy concerns.75  A veritable
taxonomy of potential privacy violations exists.76 Many of these
concerns, such as confidentiality breaches and information insecurity,
result from inadequate privacy safeguards.77 Critics contend that the
FTC has failed to invoke preventative measures designed to prevent
such violations from happening in the first place.78 For example, one
suggested set of preventative measures is called the "notice and
choice" model.79 This model has been trumpeted as a system allowing
consumers control over their information.80 As its name suggests, this
model offers consumers upfront information about how the relevant
site uses consumers' personal data, with the option to proceed or leave
based on this information.8 1 Though information asymmetry may
70. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a); see Federal Trade Commission Act Section 5: Unfair or Deceptive






75. See Elspeth A. Brotherton, Comment, Big Brother gets a Makeover: Behavioral
Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 569 (2012).
76. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
77. See id. at 490-91.
78. See Clark D. Asay, Consumer Information Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party
Disclosures, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 321, 327 (2013).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Brotherton, supra note 75, at 577-78. ("[]Jf the [Supreme] Court decides that
people in general have notice of a risk, the Court treats any given individual as having consented
to the risk as though the individual had both actual knowledge of the risk and an opportunity to
reject it.").
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render such "choice" illusory, the model nonetheless provides a
starting point for data protection.8 2 For example, in HIPAA, the
notice and choice model requires specifics, such as identification of the
possible third-party users.83 But instead of requiring liable companies
to adopt this baseline measure, the FTC usually defers to industry
standards: it prosecutes companies for failing to comply with their
own internal privacy policies.8 4 By meeting companies on their own
terms rather than holding them to higher standards, the FTC confines
the results to self-regulatory pitfalls.85 Critics suggest the FTC's
neglect of front-end enforcement measures has contributed to the lack
of meaningful privacy safeguards in the industry, despite the FTC's
continued pursuit of violators.86
Further, the FTC faces several challenges in its quest to
regulate secondary data practices.8 7 First, its efficacy depends on
forces outside its control.88 Various factors, from public attitudes to
political climate, shape the FTC's agenda and makeup.8 9 Second, the
FTC's limited enforcement abilities narrow its impact.90 It pursues
individual companies on the basis of individual incidents-responses
that do not compel widespread consumer privacy reform.91 Also,
though the FTC's successful prosecution efforts may deter some
consumer privacy violations, arguably the incremental nature of this
process does not track emerging concerns.92  Further, the FTC's
expansive objectives require it to patrol a litany of consumer issues.93
In sum, its limited resources and external pressures prevent it from
meaningfully shaping consumer privacy protection.94
82. See id. at 587.
83. See Asay, supra note 78, at 326.
84. See id.
85. See Brotherton, supra note 75, at 569.
86. See id.
87. See generally Peter Maass, Your FTC Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive,
Toothless, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/2012/06/ftc-fail] [http://perma.cc/TC5J-74AU] (criticizing




91. See id.; see also Stephanie A. Kuhlmann, Legislative Update: DO NOT TRACK ME
ONLINE: The Logistical Struggles Over the Right to Be Let Alone, 22 DEPAUL J. ART TECH &
INTELL. PROP. L. 229, 234, 250 (2011).
92. See id. (comparing the FTC to "a runner with two sprained ankles" due to its limited
legal power and small staff).
93. Id.
94. See id.; FED. TRADE COMM'N, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's





Many states have created their own consumer privacy rules to
address the lacking federal response. The result is a patchwork of
evolving privacy laws.96 On one hand, the laws offer safeguards for
personal data in a variety of salient areas, from student-data privacy
to email searches.97 These laws enable states to address their citizens'
prevalent privacy concerns, and arguably encourage states to act as
laboratories for a national audience.98  The current spectrum of
experimental data laws may facilitate successful models for data
protection.99  However, this host of new laws poses multiple
problems.100  The myriad of different laws makes compliance
challenging for Internet companies.10 1 Also, states' efforts to protect
personal data may be tempered by the online industry's aggressive
lobbying.10 2 California's current laws reflect this tug-of-war.10 3 The
state emerged as a leading advocate of consumer privacy rights by
passing a "do-not-track" bill and criminalizing the online publication
of identifiable nude photos.10 4 But lobbying efforts brought down its
third proposal, the "right-to-know" bill, which would have required




The Supreme Court has struggled to align constitutional
notions of privacy with advancing technology.'0 6  The Fourth
Amendment provides the battleground for fights over constitutional
privacy issues.10 7 It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and











104. Id.; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (2013),
http:/ILeginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill-id=201320140AB370
[http://perma.cc/3J3A-R68L].
105. See Sengupta, supra note 95
106. See Bedi, supra note 50, at 37.
107. See id.
2032015]
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protects the right of the people to be secure in their homes.108 While
the amendment aims to protect Americans' privacy, in Olmstead v.
United States, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
government's warrantless wire-tapping because it did not invade the
defendant's physical property.'0 9 Justice Brandeis, in a prescient
dissent, said the Court must contemplate "not only of what has been
but of what may be" when applying the Constitution.110 He argued
that the Fourth Amendment's language imbued the character of such
protections, not their physical manifestations.' Someday, Brandeis
warned, technology's advances may enable the government to expose
intimate personal details without "removing papers from secret
drawers."112
However, the Court's next major privacy decision, Katz v.
United States, arguably eroded common-law trespassory protections
by adding the "reasonable expectations test."113 The Court held the
Fourth Amendment did not protect a person's knowing, voluntary
exposure of information in public, even in his home.114 A person's
subjective privacy expectations would warrant Fourth Amendment
protection only if society recognized them as "objectively
reasonable."1
15
But recent cases reflect the disconnect between emerging
technology and a realistic, satisfying societal privacy standard.16 In
Kyllo v. United States, the Court confronted a case involving the
government's warrantless thermal imaging of a suspect's home.117
The Court held that the government eavesdropping constituted an
unlawful search.118 Justice Scalia echoed Brandeis's concerns, saying,
"[I]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the
advance of technology."' 19 Finally, in the landmark United States v.
Jones decision, the Court returned to a property-based privacy
approach, holding the government's warrantless use of a GPS tracker
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. TV.
109. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
110. See id. at 473.
111. See id. at 477.
112. Id. at 474.
113. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
114. See id. at 360.
115. See id. 361 (noting that the "reasonable expectations test" would calibrate individual
privacy expectations with societal norms) (Harlan, J., concurring).
116. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).
117. Id. at 29.




on the defendant's car an unlawful trespass.120 Nonetheless, Justice
Sotomayor criticized existing privacy jurisprudence.121 In particular,
she questioned the Katz premise that information disclosed to third
parties does not deserve privacy protection.122 Calling the premise
"ill-suited to the digital age," Sotomayor highlighted the asymmetry
between how much information individuals reveal to third parties in
exchange for the mere "convenience" of completing daily tasks.123 She
further noted the tautology of relying on a societal norm for privacy
expectations as technology pushes its "inevitable" diminution.
1 24
C. "I'll Hold the Popcorn" Secondary Use Problems with the
Third-Party Doctrine
Sotomayor's opinion crystallized the third-party doctrine's
striking threat to personal privacy.125 In today's digitized world, third
parties have become default channels for moving and storing personal
information.126 Only a thin film separates third-party data brokers
from the government, which can use its subpoena power to obtain
personal information. 27 Given the illusory protection rendered to
personal data, secondary data use seems even farther removed from
meaningful protection.128
1. The Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine provides a corollary to the Katz
"reasonable expectations" rationale for Fourth Amendment privacy.129
The third-party doctrine asserts that a person has no reasonable
expectations of privacy against the government if he voluntarily
discloses information to a third party.130 In United States v. Miller,
the seminal third-party doctrine case, the Supreme Court held the
120. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
121. See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 962.
125. See id. at 957-58.
126. See Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party
Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FL. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 67 (2011) ("Just because a person
transmits information into cyberspace should not imply that the person has relinquished his or
her right to privacy .... [L]ife in the twenty-first century occurs in cyberspace.").
127. See Brotherton, supra note 75, at 571 (stating that the third-party doctrine allows
the government to circumvent the Fourth Amendment and go on legal "fishing expeditions"); see
also Constine, supra note 53.
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government's warrantless search of the defendant's financial records
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.13' The Court said the
defendant had no reasonable expectations of privacy because he
volunteered his financial information to a third party-his bank.132
This indicates that a person's expectation that his information would
be used for limited purposes does not shield him from government
intrusion. 133
The implications of the third-party doctrine are problematic for
several reasons.'34  First, the third-party doctrine's premise is
outdated.135  In today's world, virtually all communications move
across networks via third-party systems, such as Facebook and
Google.'36 The third-party doctrine thus conflates the act of modern
communication with "voluntary" relinquishment of one's information:
in fact, there is no viable alternative.'37  Indeed, the third-party
doctrine's origins evince its outmoded rationale.1 38 The third-party
doctrine bases its voluntary principle on a human context for
information disclosure.139 That is, critical to the "voluntary" element
is the assumption that people share their information through other
humans. The Supreme Court case Smith v. Maryland illustrates this
flawed premise.'40 In the early days of the third-party doctrine,
calling someone else meant passing personal information through a
phone operator.'41  Thus, communicating through third parties
required deliberate disclosure to another human being.'42 Making
phone calls and sending mail carried the implicit risk that the person
on the other end passing the information on to the sender might
connect a lot of dots in Small Town, USA.' 43 But the subsequent
131. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
132. See id.
133. See Brotherton, supra note 75, at 571.
134. See Ghoshray, supra note 126, at 73; Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth
Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581 (2011).
135. See Tokson, supra note 134, at 585.
136. See Ghoshray, supra note 126, at 73 (noting that "Smith held that there is one
necessary condition to complete the communication- voluntarily disclosing such information to a
third party .... The necessary condition I am referring to is the continued evolution of human
existence.").
137. See id.
138. See Tokson, supra note 134, at 634.
139. See id.
140. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
141. See Tokson, supra note 134, at 585.
142. See id. at 600.
143. See id. at 615.
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automation of third-party processes removes that meaningful and
intentional assumption of risk.144
2. Beyond the Third-Party Doctrine: Other Privacy Arguments
Critics of the privacy movement have seized upon the
third-party doctrine's continued life as evidence that society does not
care about information privacy.145 Since anti-privacy arguments also
necessarily reject secondary data concerns, this Section will briefly
address several prominent anti-privacy critiques.
146  First, critics
argue that the mere disclosure of information carries an assumption of
risk.147 Willful disclosure negates privacy expectations because the
act itself exposes information.148 However, privacy advocates contend
this argument distorts the idea of privacy.149 Privacy is not binary.150
Providing information to a selective circle of people, or in a designated
forum, does not contemplate its complete public exposure.
151 To the
contrary, limiting disclosure of information indicates the user intends
to keep her data within certain bounds.
152
Second, critics argue the current piecemeal privacy regime
shows that society does not value privacy enough to enact stronger
protections.153  However, this argument does not account for
behavioral fallacies that online privacy tends to invoke.154  For
instance, users tend to underestimate the potential risk of privacy
harms. To them, the immediate gratification of using "risky" websites
seems to outweigh the chance their personal information will be
misused.155 Websites prod users to accept these future risks by
presenting them with lengthy privacy policies while trumpeting their
144. See id. at 582 (explaining that in the Fourth Amendment context, people assumed
the risk that persons with whom people converse may reveal the information to others, yet "the
information disclosed to these online third parties is generally not exposed to human beings at
all; rather, it is processed entirely by automated equipment ... However, courts have, without
discussing the issue, already begun to treat automated Internet systems as the equivalent of
human beings.").
145. See Nicole A. Ozer, Putting Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social
Movement and Creating Corporate Change, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 223-26
(2012).
146. Cf. id.
147. See Brotherton, supra note 75, at 577.
148. See Ghoshray, supra note 126, at 74-75.
149. See Solove, supra note 76, at 535.
150. See Tokson, supra note 134, at 617.
151. See Solove, supra note 76, at 535.
152. See id.
153. See Ozer, supra note 145, at 223.
154. See id. at 226.
155. See id.
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sites as "free."15 6 These factors, coupled with the appeal and ease of
"free" advertising, may persuade people to undervalue risks to their
personal privacy.157 Further, these individual fallacies contribute to
the collective action problem that online privacy faces.58 Framing
privacy as an individual decision undermines the universal,
interconnected nature of the issue.159 Indeed, public polls belie the
notion that consumers remain unconcerned about their online privacy
and could possibly even be unaware of these issues.160
3. Secondary Data Use: What's the Harm, Really?
Critics contend that even if the current state of privacy law is
problematic, it does not merit significant attention because privacy
issues often do not evince actual harm.1 61 Actual harm refers to
traditional categories of tortious consequences, such as financial or
physical damage.162 However, online privacy harms pose intangible
effects which may prove nonetheless devastating.163 For example,
potential harms posed by secondary data use include harms to dignity,
power imbalances between the data holder and the data proprietor,
and data misappropriation.1 64 Secondary data use may seem less
likely to pose privacy harms than interpersonal data because data
brokers slice identifying information into bits.165 However, secondary
data use arguably threatens just as much information insecurity.166
Data brokers do not sell secondary data in isolation.1 67 Thus, even if
secondary data is anonymized, research shows such disparate parts
are easily de-anonymized.68 For example, researchers reassembled
anonymized Netflix data to reveal users' political and religious views
156. See id. at 225-26.
157. See id. at 223.
158. See id. at 224.
159. See Andrew Clement & Christie Hurrell, Information/Communication Rights as a
New Environmentalism, COMPUTERIZATION MOVEMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION: FROM
MAINFRAMES TO UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (2008).
160. See Ozer, supra note 145, at 222.
161. See id. at 228.
162. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 174-79 (Harvard University
Press, 2008).
163. See id.
164. See Solove, supra note 76, at 487-90.
165. See, e.g., Ozer, supra note 145, at 228 (explaining that "independently innocuous
data points" can be aggregated in revealing ways because data brokers can retain disparate bits
of individual information to form fuller profiles of them, which may de-anonymize them).
166. See id.




just based on their movie histories.169  In another study, one
researcher used three public cross-reference points with the public
census to uniquely identify 87 percent of the US population.170 This
researcher simply took the public anonymous data and combined
people's five-digit ZIP codes with their sex and date of birth to
uniquely identify specific people.
171
Moreover, reaggregation of secondary data may distort third
parties' impressions of user profiles.172 Incomplete data sets heighten
the risk that these inaccuracies may be manipulated.1 73 In such
instances, harm occurs regardless of whether or not damage results
from specific instances of misuse.174 The specter of secondary data
manipulation threatens to have a chilling effect on personal
behavior.175 As people grow increasingly aware of the uncertain
implications of secondary data, their understanding informs and
inhibits behavior.176 In sum, far from harmless, secondary data use
threatens to erode basic freedoms if it remains unchecked.
177
II. ANALYSIS
This Part divides analysis of secondary data solutions based on
the onus for each solution.178 Each Section is categorized by which
entity or regime bears the responsibility of carrying out the privacy
framework.1 79  Section A discusses putting the onus on a social
movement. Section B discusses putting the onus on federal law.
Section C discusses putting the onus on the private industry.
However, several proposals offer intriguing twists on traditional
privacy frameworks by integrating principles from different sources.
169. See id. at 230.
170. See Ozer, supra note 145, at 229.
171. See id.
172. See Solove, supra note 76, at 482-84.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 482.
175. See Solove, supra note 76, at 559 ("[Dlecisional interference also resembles
insecurity, secondary use, and exclusion. . . TWhese information-processing harms can have a
chilling effect on a person's decisions regarding her health and body.").
176. See id.
177. See id.
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A. Social Movement
One proposed solution involves framing the privacy problem as
a social movement.180 The burden of this movement would fall on the
privacy community to harness their collective resources to effectuate
change.'8' Growing literature on social-movement theory focuses on
using the environmental movement as starting reference.8 2 This
framework aims to leverage successful activism into a platform for
permanent, sustainable access to power.8 3
There are several benefits to this approach.8 4 First, the social
movement works easily as a framing device because the burgeoning
privacy movement shares many similarities with the environmental
movement.185 The Internet parallels an ecosystem because it contains
a sphere of interconnected actors and systems.8 6 Further, the ready
similarities between online and offline ecosystems offer palpable
metaphors to cohere difficult ideas about privacy.8 7 Thus, proponents
of this framework suggest that privacy advocates can adapt
environmental movement's familiar concepts to articulate their own
strategies.88 For instance, viewing secondary data's potential harms
as an externality may spur disparate strands of the privacy movement
to unite as a stronger force for change.18 9 Environmental activists
galvanized public awareness by highlighting environmental disasters
like oil spills and filing activist lawsuits against industry polluters.90
Similarly, privacy advocates could rouse public alarm for secondary
data misuse, decrying dangers posed by widespread hacking and suing
repeat offenders.191
Critics argue the social movement framework does not provide
a viable solution.192 First, they contend data privacy concerns are not
ripe for a social movement.193 Privacy scholar Colin Bennett analyzed
180. See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements and Law Reform: Social Movements, Law,
and Society: The Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85
(2001); see also Clement & Hurrell, supra note 159; Ozer, supra note 146, at 218.
181. See Clement & Hurrell, supra note 159, at 340.
182. See, e.g., id.
183. See Coglianese, supra note 180, at 87.
184. See id.




189. See, e.g., id. at 15.
190. See Coglianese, supra note 180, at 91.
191. See id.




the emerging privacy community with social movement
characteristics.'94 He concluded the privacy community lacked such
essential features as a common focal point to rally the community for
change.195 Privacy means different things to different people.196 Due
to this lack of uniformity, privacy's variable definitions thus cut
against mass mobilization.197  Second, critics argue that episodic
public alarm over national privacy incidents cannot sustain collective
action.198 Finally, the scale of the demand is daunting. Information
"wants to be free."'199 The sheer volume of information released into
the online ether poses complex tracking problems, making it difficult




A second approach to addressing secondary data concerns puts
the onus on the federal government. This approach elevates
secondary data to the national forefront.20 1 Though specific proposals
differ, their general approach shares several characteristics. First,
this approach aims to streamline secondary data processes in ethical,
yet efficient, ways.20 2 Second, this approach suggests that secondary
data should be considered a "public good. '20 3 Acceptance-or perhaps
resignation to-secondary data's widespread use accompanies this
premise.20 4  Thus, the approach seeks to balance concerns from
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See Adam Thierer, Privacy, Security, and Human Dignity in the Digital Age; The
Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
409, 414 (2013) (citing Professor Daniel J. Solove's description of privacy as a "conceptual
jungle").
197. See id.
198. See Ozer, supra note 145, at 232.
199. See Thierer, supra note 196, at 431.
200. See id.
201. See Charles Safran et al., Toward a National Framework for the Secondary Use of
Health Data: An American Medical Informatics Association White Paper, 14 J. AM. MED. INFORM.
ASSOC., 1, 3 (2007).
202. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,




203. See Safran et al., supra note 201, at 6; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski,
Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65
SMU L. REV. 85, 90 (2012).
204. See Asay, supra note 78, at 335.
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stakeholders on both sides of secondary data transactions. Third, the
approach emphasizes education as a necessary corollary to the law's
successful implementation.20 5  Education legitimizes people's
autonomy and empowers them to make informed decisions about
secondary data.20 6  Further, the educated public would serve as a
democratic check on objectionable federal regulation and firm
policies.20 7 Finally, the approach is multifaceted.208 Additional prongs
supplement the proposed federal laws.20 9 These prongs range from
privacy principles to security safeguards.2 0 Such models arguably
reflect the complex nature of the challenges secondary data pose.21'
2. Model Federal Law Proposal
For instance, scholar Clark D. Asay suggests a model federal
law to address the current piecemeal regime.212  This proposal
provides the baseline of privacy safeguards that states have failed to
achieve.21 3  The law would invoke the notice-and-choice model to
effectuate the safety mechanisms.214 It focuses on holding companies
accountable for third parties' secondary uses of consumer
information.215 Like California's Data Security Breach Act, the law
would require companies to notify consumers if third parties used
their data beyond the purposes for which it was intended.21 6 The law
would also require companies to disclose the third parties who use the
secondary data.217 Additionally, the law would provide consumers
with a right of action to enforce their privacy rights.218 However, the
law's terms constrain its reach.219 Per the law's definition, it would
only apply to data termed "personally identifiable information"
205. See FTC Report, supra note 202, at 13; Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at
128.
206. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 128.
207. See id. at 138-39.
208. See id. at 143.
209. See id.
210. See, e.g., id. at 127.
211. See, e.g., Deidre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King, PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL CHANGE: Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 989, 1025 (2012).
212. See Asay, supra note 78, at 324.
213. See id. at 329.
214. See id. at 323.
215. See Mulligan & King, supra note 211, at 999-1000.
216. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (2015).
217. See Asay, supra note 78, at 340.
218. See id. at 351.
219. See, e.g., id. at 341 ("[Dlisclosures of non-PII could still result in some subjective
privacy harm for consumers .... ).
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(PII).220 So, the law would exclude potential PHI that had been
aggregated and anonymized.
221
Similarly, President Obama recently contributed his own
proposed model law to this approach.222 In a speech introducing the
law, President Obama explained, "Each of us as individuals have a
sphere of privacy around us that should not be breached, whether by
our government, but also by commercial interests.'223 Though details
are still emerging, the law's framework sounds similar to Asay's
proposed model law.224 Called the Personal Data Notification and
Protection Act (PDNPA), this law aims to begin fixing the patchwork
of privacy laws by providing a national baseline of privacy
standards.225 Like the model law, the PDNPA works through an
accountability mechanism to achieve this goal, requiring companies to
notify consumers of data breaches within a specified time.
226
However, PDNPA seems to focus on reacting to primary data
breaches, not secondary data issues.
227
3. HIPAA as Alternative Model Law
An alternative source for federal law comes from an extant
framework, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA). HIPAA provides an infrastructure of laws, policies, and
best practices to protect personally identifiable healthcare records.
228
The rapid rise of unregulated secondary data use in the healthcare
sector has prompted scholars to label the secondary data mining
industry an "urgent" concern.229  While the merits of facilitating
limited secondary data use is beyond the bounds of this Note, the
healthcare industry's insights on secondary data may offer innovative
ways to confront its complex issues.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Michael D. Shear & Natasha Singer, Obama to Call for Laws Covering Data




224. See id.; see, e.g., Asay, supra note 78, at 324.
225. See Shear & Singer, supra note 222.
226. See id.; see, e.g., Asay, supra note 78, at 322.
227. See Shear & Singer, supra note 222 (explaining other components to the speech
included proposing measures to prevent collection of such information as school data, home
energy data, and credit scores).
228. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 95.
229. See Safran et al., supra note 201.
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HIPAA's current privacy safeguards provide the groundwork
for secondary data protections.230  HIPAA organizes healthcare
information into a taxonomy of confidentiality categories. A "safe
harbor" provision ensures data is anonymized before potential
disclosure to third parties, cabined by a statistical standard that
determines risk of re-identification.231 Additionally, HIPAA requires
breach notifications for certain types of information and offers an
outside governmental mechanism, the Office of Civil Rights, as a
means of enforcement.2
32
This HIPAA-based framework aligns national standards to
create a multitiered model for secondary data.233  To start, this
approach would shift the law's focus from a notice-and-choice model to
a notice-and-education model.234 Advocates of this model argue that
pivoting from "choice" to "education" provides a more meaningful,
realistic balance between consumer autonomy and secondary data's
upsurge.235 By fostering public dialogue and transparency about
secondary data practices, advocates hope to engender sufficient public
trust to implement a meaningful consent system.236 In turn, the
public's newfound familiarity with the privacy spectrum could
facilitate greater flow of information through secondary data's
regulated use.237 New, more nuanced consent systems would render
the current broad-based privacy options obsolete.238  A series of
external checks would reinforce privacy protections and unify
expectations for handling secondary data access, use, and misuse.239
These include a national set of working definitions for secondary data
and regular auditing by independent security experts.240
This enhanced HIPAA-inspired model could offer several
advantages. First, streamlining secondary data could promote its
efficient use for public service.241  For example, researchers could
analyze the data to ward off epidemics through early detection.242
230. See, e.g., id. at 5.
231. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 96, 130.
232. See id. at 138.
233. See, e.g., Safran et al., supra note 201, at 4.
234. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 139 (arguing that educating data
subjects about records-based research concerns should replace requiring their consent for
inclusion in health studies).
235. See, e.g., id. at 138.
236. See id. at 138-40.
237. See id.
238. See Asay, supra note 78, at 333 (criticizing the "blanket opt in/opt out system").
239. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 91.
240. See id. at 102.
241. See FTC Report, supra note 202, at 13.
242. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 127.
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Second, educating the public arguably lends agency to choices about
personally identifiable information. 43 As such, offering a spectrum of
consent options validates the public's understanding of secondary data
with third party use by aligning access on both sides.244 Finally,
perhaps the HIPAA-inspired model's greatest advantage stems from
its overarching, multifaceted approach to secondary data.245  By
offering a flexible set of tools, the approach reflects and responds to
the complex demands of secondary data concerns.
246
However, the HIPAA-based approach to secondary data use
confronts several problems. First, this approach may be limited by
preexisting confines.247 Suggestions for dealing with HIPAA-related
secondary data command a deep, perhaps insular, focus on a
specialized industry.248  Further, these suggestions are not just
healthcare specific, but supplemental provisions to HIPAA's original
laws.249 Thus, applying HIPAA's secondary data standards to broader
commercialized secondary data may prove inappropriate and
unpredictable.25 0 Second, the proposals may suffer irrelevance from
technology's rapid advances.25 1 Secondary data exchange has already
outstripped the legal and ethical procedures in place.252 It is unclear
whether even a multifaceted filter of controls would be able to keep
up.253 Finally, this model may fail to provide sufficient reliability and
protection for personally identifiable information.254  Critics of
de-identification have argued that a variety of commercial
stakeholders possess an overriding interest in obtaining salient
consumer data.255 Similarly, new consent options may prove just as
illusory as the old ones;25 6 potential permission requests for secondary
243. See, e.g., id. at 141.
244. See, e.g., id.
245. See id. at 143.
246. See id.
247. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 78, at 326 (citing industry-specific federal sectorial laws
in the current privacy regime).
248. See id.
249. See, e.g., Safran et al., supra note 201, at 5 (proposing to fill the gaps in HIPAA's
current infrastructure); see also Ayres, supra note 57, at 1019 (proposing a model law to expand
HIPAA's static privacy rules).
250. See Asay, supra note 78, at 325.
251. See Brotherton, supra note 75, at 581.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 561.
255. Examples of interests which may override these ethical concerns include an
insurer's interest in the insured's health records and a blackmailer's in the target's financial
records. See id.; see also Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 104.
256. See Brotherton, supra note 75, at 582.
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data may be too complex to effectively administer so far in advance.257
These issues may render de-identification procedures ineffectual at
keeping secondary data out of inappropriate hands.
258
C. Industry
A third approach to secondary data protection puts the onus on
the companies that use it.259 Tasking the problem's source with its
solution makes intuitive sense, in a way.260  Advocates of this
approach start with the simple premise that companies should "do
better.'261 Also, advocates insist privacy controls constitute a basic
tenet of doing business-companies hould take reasonable steps to
protect consumer privacy because such measures are integral to basic
customer relations.2
62
Privacy by design offers one prominent example of a private
sector solution. This is a process guided by a set of values, the Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPP).263 Put another way, privacy
by design is a systematic approach to embedding privacy into the
underlying architecture of any technology.264 Per FIPP, this approach
seeks to integrate privacy as a core technology component.265 In doing
so, this approach seeks to make privacy a prerequisite instead of an
afterthought.266 Privacy by design has several possible advantages.
First, it is proactive.267 To comply with FIPPs, companies would have
to embed privacy into the underlying architecture of their products.268
Demanding front-end privacy changes could bolster privacy's parallel
evolution with technology's advances.269  Indeed, studies show that
integrating privacy during the design phase is more efficient and less
257. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 121 (explaining that some future
medical research projects probably involve too much speculation about information use for
present meaningful consent).
258. See id. at 103.
259. See Ira S. Rubinstein, Technology: Transforming the Regulatory Endeavor:
Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1414 (2011).
260. See id.
261. See, e.g., Mulligan & King, supra note 211, at 1028 ("[C]ompanies have an obligation
to attend to consumers' understandings of the normal rules of engagement during online
interactions and that if they want to deviate and capture novel information they must 'clearly
and prominently disclose' and gain consent....").
262. See Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1455.
263. See id. at 1418.
264. See id. at 1411-12.
265. See id. at 1420-21.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 1431.
268. See id. at 1412.
269. See id. at 1426; see also Ayres, supra note 57, at 976.
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costly than resolving security issues later on.270  Second, it is
flexible.271  Unlike federal law requirements, which may prove
unwieldy or rote for key industry players, the approach allows
companies to customize privacy applications to their particular
technologies and audiences.2 7 2 Further, this flexible approach may
facilitate privacy innovations.273 Advocates of privacy by design have
pointed out that assigning the privacy challenge to the technology
sector complements their privileged role in society.27 4 Because they
are the chief architects of the current environment riddled with
privacy issues, they are well-positioned to craft a more
privacy-protective version.275  Moreover, the steps they take to
improve privacy protections may produce positive secondary effects on
corresponding issues. For example, industry-wide adoption of privacy
by design principles would foster commonly accepted data practices.
276
The universal nature of such best practices facilitates consumer
trust.277  In turn, such consumers' coherent expectations could
promote more meaningful choices about consent.
But this approach suffers from several drawbacks. First, the
technology industry has been slow to adopt it.278 Without more urgent
pressures, it is unclear how or when the approach would crystallize
into efficacy.279 Second, privacy by design is costly.280 It often requires
companies to reverse their default privacy schemes, which consumes
time, research, and money.28 1 Further, no resounding evidence shows
heartier privacy controls would offer companies any competitive
advantage.28 2  Indeed, to the contrary, secondary data's booming
industry attributes its success to the lack of privacy controls.
28 3 In
totality, financial disincentives to create meaningful privacy
protections feed the self-perpetuating cycle of doubt over privacy's
270. See Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1426.
271. See, e.g., FTC Report, supra note 202, at 44 (suggesting companies incorporate
privacy design throughout the life cycles of their products and services).
272. See id.
273. See Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1453.
274. See Mulligan & King, supra note 211, at 991.
275. See id.
276. See, e.g., FTC Report, supra note 202; see also Ayres, supra note 57, at n.295;
Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1440 (linking the diminished trust from privacy breaches to the
potential loss of consumers).
277. See id.
278. See Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1412.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 1443.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 1436.
283. See id. at 1439-40.
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commercial viability. 28 4 The lack of privacy research is reinforced by
the lack of apparent financial incentive to invest in it, and so the
self-perpetuating cycle spirals into market failure.285 Finally, privacy
by design may not produce the universal outcomes that its advocates
ideate.28 6 The approach may be too amorphous to translate into
concrete, consistent privacy practices.28 7 Companies may also prove
too skittish or burdened by competing financial stakes to police the
bounds of their world.28 8  Thus, the fallacies of self-regulation
arguably amplify privacy by design's potential inconsistencies.28 9
These potential shortcomings have not stopped scholars from
proposing solutions to address the private sector's potential market
failures. For instance, one healthcare scholar suggests seizing upon
the private sector's financial motives to craft a compromise between
third parties and consumers regarding secondary data use.290 This
proposal would use a subscription model for secondary data.291 The
subscription model would revolve around a self-regulated federation of
networks.292 Third parties would pay the federation to subscribe to
and use pre-filtered data the federation aggregated.293 Such a system
could financially sustain the secondary data industry while protecting
consumers' sensitive data.294
Alternatively, data scholar Ira S. Rubinstein has suggested
remedying current privacy market failures with a coregulatory
approach.295 Rubinstein argues this approach combines necessary
regulatory controls to address privacy's market failures while
retaining sufficient flexibility to spur innovation.296 The approach
retains this flexibility through a variety of possible legal tools.297
These options range from agency rulemaking, which requires industry
input, to safe harbor provisions, which would exempt companies from
certain privacy regulations if they were granted the opportunity to
explore experimental privacy solutions.298
284. See, e.g., id.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 1421.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 1445.
289. See id.
290. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 120.




295. See Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1451.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 1451-52.
298. See id. at 1452.
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An intriguing twist to the coregulatory approach by scholars
Deidre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King proposes deriving privacy
principles from the growing field of Human Computer Interaction
(HCI).299 HCI focuses on individual control and humans' interpersonal
boundaries to shape a dynamic view of privacy.300 HCI relies on user
context for effectiveness.30 1  This paradigm thus places the user,
rather than the information, at the center of the privacy inquiry.
30 2 In
doing so, HCI aims to craft privacy models that reflect normative user
experiences.30 3  Individuated privacy models could offer accurate,
sensitive bounds amenable to optimal user interaction.
30 4
III. SOLUTION
Putting the responsibility on any single entity threatens to
perpetuate the shortcomings that first propagated the unregulated
secondary data market.3 0 5  Yet left untouched, secondary data's
continued proliferation may result in irreparable privacy
infringements on people's lives. 30 6 Given the urgent and latent nature
of the secondary data problem, the federal government should
implement a two-fold tactic.30 7  Following Rubinstein's lead, a
coregulatory approach involving both federal law and the private
sector should be adopted.308 A coregulatory approach would provide
the most potent, feasible solution to this complex issue.30 9 At the most
basic level, the federal law would provide three components that build
off each other: (1) a guiding premise, (2) a basic framework for
minimum secondary data privacy standards modeled off the guiding
premise, and (3) sanctions to enforce the standards.310  The private
299. See Mulligan & King, supra note 211, at 993.
300. See id. at 1019.
301. See id. at 1022.
302. See id. at 1023.
303. See id. at 993.
304. See id. at 1023.
305. Cf. Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1443.
306. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 57, at 971.
307. See Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1445.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. This approach is inspired by a convergence of the aforementioned frameworks.
Representative inspirations for the three-component formula include: cf. Shear & Singer, supra
note 222 ("[W]e want a federal baseline, and leave the states with the freedom to establish
stronger standards.") (quoting Marc Rotenberg, the president of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center). See generally FTC Report, supra note 202 (privacy should be the default
setting); Asay, supra note 78 (federal law and sanction system suggested); Mulligan & King;
supra note 211 (HCI principles as underlying guidance); Rubinstein, supra note 260 (minimum
federal standards to allow flexibility for firms to adapt).
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sector would complement federal law by crafting solutions based off
the federal scheme.311 The guiding premise would follow user-centric
HCI principles rather than contract principles, lending the model a
flexible, normative framework.
312
As previously discussed, privacy models often rely on a central
premise to anchor their frameworks. Unlike previously discussed
models, however, this proposed privacy model would invoke HCI
principles to guide its framework.3 3 Models that focus on contract
theories are ineffectual because they reduce privacy decisions to rigid,
law-focused constructs.3 4  Most humans are not lawyers.31 5
Furthermore, privacy is not bilateral.316 Thus, the human-centric
principles of HCI vastly improve upon existing privacy models by
seeking to adapt privacy preferences to users, rather than the other
way around.17 Based on HCI principles, then, the federal law model
would work off the following simple premise: privacy is the default,
and the user is the focus.318
A. Framework
This central premise translates into an intuitive, user-based
privacy model.319 Called the "Signal Model," it derives from the
ubiquitous traffic signal system.320 The Signal Model allows the user
to allocate her data permissions with three privacy "signals."321 These
privacy signals dictate third-party permissions. Each privacy signal
corresponds to a traffic light color and its requisite meaning. The
green "Go" signal means the user allows third parties to use all data.
The red "Stop" signal means third parties do not have permission to
use any of the data. The yellow "Caution" signal means the data use
is context-specific and the user could release permissions on the data
depending on the situation. While the scope of data subject to the
Signal Model would have to be determined, ideally the user could
311. See generally Rubinstein, supra note 259.
312. See generally Mulligan & King, supra note 211.
313. See generally id.
314. See Brotherton, supra note 75, at 567.
315. See Legal Profession Statistics, AM.BAR ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/resources for-lawyers/profession-statistics.html [http://perma.cc/
KA6F-AGQ8].
316. See generally Solove, supra note 76.
317. See generally Mulligan & King, supra note 211.
318. See generally id.
319. See generally id.
320. See generally id.
321. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 78, at n.158 (citing studies suggesting food labels aid
consumers in providing meaningful notice and information to improve their choices).
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apply the Signal Model to whatever groups of data that website offers.
Potential data categories could include particular data outcomes users
wanted to exclude or particular categories of information.
322
Critics of the Signal Model would likely question whether this
system translates into realistically customizable controls.323 After all,
the Signal Model may not adequately target the variable nature of
secondary data permissions.324  In this way, the Signal Model's
permission system may not sufficiently equate the user's
understanding of what she permits data brokers to use with the data
broker's understanding of what or how it can use the data.3 25 While
this is an understandable concern, it is arguably inevitable: at some
point, virtually any consent system, no matter how granular, will not
capture a subset of user privacy.326  Further, if companies
implemented these heightened privacy frameworks, they would
probably pass on the increased costs to consumers.327 The Signal
Model is meant to provide a feasible starting point, not an end
solution, to address these perpetual challenges.328 Further, this may
be an optimal role for the federal government to take on, with ongoing
education and a reliable sanctioning system to alleviate concerns
about distortion between permission and use.3 29 Namely, the federal
government could appoint the FTC to facilitate education and
sanctions for this new model, as the FTC has analogous experience
implementing other regulatory frameworks.
330
The Signal Model offers several advantages. First, it adheres
to HCI's context-dependent, individualistic approach to privacy.
331
Each user has a different idea of what privacy means, what types of
personal information she is willing to share, and what ways she is
willing to share it.332 The Signal Model gives each user the
322. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 203, at 121.
323. See Mulligan & King, supra note 211, at 1022.
324. See id.
325. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 78, at 324.
326. See FTC Report, supra note 202, at 55 (suggesting a limited set of data practices be
addressed through privacy by design).
327. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 20
(2000).
328. Cf. Asay, supra note 78, at 324.
329. See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1451.
330. See id. at 1446 (citing the FTC's experience as a regulatory actor to support its
enforcement role in a co-regulatory approach, including such sanctioning methods as pursuing
strategic cases); FTC Report, supra note 202, at 14 (describing the FTC's role in educating
technology and business companies on privacy issues through such efforts as public roundtables,
whitepapers, and workshops).
331. See Mulligan & King, supra note 211, at 1022.
332. See id.
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opportunity to completely individuate and protect her personal
information based on how she values it. 333 The intuitive appeal of
aligning data choices with traffic lights makes the process easy to
use.334 At the same time, the Signal Model offers the technology
industry a universal set of expectations to expedite its ability to
incorporate corresponding privacy features.335 Finally, this universal
system facilitates the federal government's enforcement of privacy
violations. Breaches of the system would be highlighted by any data
broker's explicit exploitation of "red" data and possibly "yellow" data.
Meanwhile, the yellow signal acts as a safe harbor mechanism for
users and third parties by rendering its corresponding secondary data
use context-specific.336  Whereas before data brokers had little
incentive to negotiate with their ostensible sources of income, now
yellow signal data could drive third parties and their primary data
counterparts to come up with innovative solutions, negotiating with
users in exchange for this data.337  Though the framework's
mechanisms for implementation and use are beyond this Note, the
Signal Model offers a robust, universal baseline for leveraging
secondary data use into a mutually agreeable exchange while
protecting user privacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Secondary data use thrives in the legal gray area that
underpins the Internet's troves of personal data. However, as scholars
and Supreme Court justices have pointed out, people's general
ignorance about technology's implications for secondary data does not
ratify its use. The inconclusive nature of studies concerning personal
privacy values, coupled with the asymmetrical incentives between
data brokers and users, supports treatment of secondary data as a
market failure. However, any singular approach to resolving this
market failure would likely fall short, as the three entities most
qualified to confront the issue have encountered their own obstacles in
doing so. And the current patchwork of state privacy laws, varied
self-regulatory efforts, and niche federal laws offer inconsistent
protection to a universal threat of irreparable and far-reaching privacy
harms. The Signal Model offers a practical coregulatory approach to
safeguard personal data while aligning incentives between third
333. See id.
334. Cf. id.
335. See generally FTC Report, supra note 202.
336. See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 259, at 1452 (suggesting safe harbors to preserve




parties and users. While designing an effective rollout mechanism for
engaging users in the Signal Model poses an initial challenge, the
Signal Model itself would provide sufficient, simple guidance for the
federal government to regulate data brokering. Though it remains to
be seen, education about secondary data may produce user reticence to
assign third-party data permissions in any capacity. Yet this
potential side effect of secondary data regulation arguably offers
technology companies precisely the opportunity to innovate that its
current unregulated use lacks. Companies could vie for users'
attention by offering economic or access incentives in exchange for
data under the green "Go" or yellow "Caution" signals. Thus the
coregulatory approach, by proposing to fit data permissions to user
needs, has the potential to pioneer privacy changes into a viable
commercial industry.
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